St. Charles Seminary Library
Carthagena, Ohio
NOV 26 1

THE Commonweal

Walter Dean Burnham

NATIONAL POLITICS AT MIDTERM

Unhealthy Party Decay?

Ann Morrissett

AMERICANS IN THE KIBBUTZIM

Pioneers in the Communal Settlements

Flirt: A Poem • *The Immigrants' Dream*
"Bounty" on Film • *A Family Exchange*
The Sad State of Satire • *The Trouble with Repertory* • *Four Wins and a Miss*

VOLUME LXXVII, NO. 10 NOVEMBER 30, 1962 TWENTY-FIVE CENTS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TIMELY...THE PERFECT CHRISTMAS GIFT!

TIMELY... Learn About Events Leading up to Today's Second Vatican (Ecumenical) Council



IMPRIMATUR
Francis
Cardinal Spellman,
Archbishop of New York

Special Pre-Christmas Price *only* **$10** (*regularly*, $12.50)

PICTORIAL HISTORY OF CATHOLICISM

by Marian McKenna, Assistant Professor of History,

Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart



Brilliantly illustrated with over 450 fascinating reproductions of world masterpieces, sculpture, maps and photographs now hanging in the famous galleries of the world: Le Louvre and La Bibliothéque Nationale in Paris... the Sistine Chapel, the Raphael Chamber in the Vatican . . . the Uffizi Gallery . . . the Prado . . . the British Museum and the National Gallery of London . . . the Metropolitan Museum of Art—to mention a few.

Here is a magnificent book—a living, breathing, superbly illustrated volume that traces the origin and development of the Catholic Church from the days of the Apostles to the present-day rule of Pope John XXIII.

"Parted Tongues of Fire..."

Read about the first Pentecost when the Holy Spirit descended upon the Apostles in the form of parted tongues of flame and bestowed divine grace on them. Follow the growth of the Church through the ages . . . its accomplishments, its problems and the solutions.

You'll want this book PICTORIAL HISTORY OF CATHOLICISM as a means to learn about the Church . . . to follow



her from the earliest days through the conversion of Western Europe, Charlemagne, and the Holy Roman Empire, the Eastern Schism, the Crusades, the Great Western Schism, the Renaissance, the Protestant Revolt, the Conversion of the New World, the Church in Latin America, right up to and including the Roman Catholic Church in the Twentieth Century.

Order NOW for Christmas Delivery

Mail the coupon below with your check to r ceive your copy—or copies—of the PICTORI HISTORY OF CATHOLICISM well before Chri mas. It is a thrilling, beautiful book... rich historic, inspiringly illustrated...a supe Christmas gift—if you can bear to part with

Philosophical Library, Publishers
15 East 40th St., New York 16

Philosophical Library, Publishers
15 East 40th St., New York 16

Please send me _____ copies of PICTORIAL HISTORY OF CATHOLICISM at $10.00 per copy. My remittance for full payment is enclosed.

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ZONE___STATE_____

C-1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE COMMONWEAL

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

Cuba: Principles and Facts

IN EVERY situation requiring an ethical decision both the facts of the matter and the relevant moral principles must be related to one another. An ethical decision which ignores principles is an amoral decision; an ethical decision which ignores facts is an irrational decision. Neither type of decision can legitimately claim to be a moral one. These distinctions apply in the realm of international politics as much as they do in that of personal morality. We do not attempt to judge a person's conduct unless we know the circumstances of his behavior; we do not attempt to judge a nation's behavior unless we know the circumstances of its actions.

It ought, really, to be unnecessary to state such obvious truths. Unhappily, the Cuban crisis has tended to obscure the obvious. The very success of President Kennedy's firm stand against Soviet missile sites in Cuba has encouraged many to call for still tougher responses to Soviet pressure in the future. For those who argue such a course, principles seem to count for little, the reality of power politics for everything. But at the other extreme are those who see in the President's success itself a very blatant denial of the principles of international justice. Both extremes, it seems apparent, view the Cuban decision as in fact a pure and simple power play.

Neither side is right. There is very little evidence to support an interpretation of the President's action as a pure instance of *Realpolitik*. In their haste to circumvent principles, arch-conservatives have done the President an injustice to interpret it in that way. But some liberals have done the President an equal injustice in their attempt to judge the decision from an abstract moral point of view.

Yet the error of the latter is a more subtle one; if the error of the former is more dangerous, the danger implicit in the latter's stand is no less real. The liberals' charge is that, by his action, the President ignored international law and justice, flaunted the peace-making agencies of the U.N. and O.A.S. and acted in a wholly amoral fashion. (We gather that this is the viewpoint of two of our correspondents in this issue's "Correspondence" section.) The trouble with this interpretation of the events is that it ignores some obvious facts.

IT IGNORES, first, the fact that the Soviet Union introduced into Cuba weapons which threatened the peace and stability of the Western hemisphere. The Soviet Union itself, once confronted with the charge of aggression, did not attempt to deny the belligerent implications of these weapons. It ignores, secondly, the solidly-established right of any nation to act in its own self-defense. This is a right explicitly stated in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It assumes, thirdly, that the intent of the President's action was aggressive and not an act of self-defense. This is a baseless assumption, flatly false in the light of the limited nature of the naval blockade, and further falsified by the President's subsequent actions.

To say, finally, that our action in blockading Cuba was to commit an injustice against that nation is to turn moral values topsy-turvy. It is to put the President's action in responding to the Soviet threat on a level of immorality with that threat. It is to put an act of self-defense into the category of aggression. It is to ignore the probable fact that the Soviet Union was using Cuba as a base for its own power moves and was only incidentally interested in Cuba's welfare. It is to ignore the obvious fact that the aim of the blockade was to counter the Soviet move and not to make a move against the Cuban nation as such.

Negotiation, it seems perfectly clear to us, is an acute necessity in this our nuclear age. But there are situations in which a nation can be forced to act promptly and may have, of necessity, to act uni-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

laterally. This does not contravene the principle of negotiation; no one, so far as we know, denies a nation the right to act unilaterally when it is faced with a clear and present danger. Few, significantly, are calling India immoral for refusing to negotiate with a Red China in the process of overrunning its borders. But should we understand the necessity of negotiation to mean that no nation may, under any circumstances, act unilaterally in self-defense, then India must be condemned for acting aggressively and threatening world peace.

It may, of course, be said that what distinguished our situation from that of the Indian situation was the very real danger of nuclear warfare; and that, given the nuclear context, the usual rationale of self-defense does not apply. That is a reasonably plausible position; but it is not a self-evidently true position. And it is surely not so plausible as to justify the charge of irresponsibility or immorality against the President.

Elections in France

THE FUTURE of President de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, which was thought to be in serious doubt only a few weeks ago, is now so certain that it is rather the future of France's Opposition Parties that is in doubt. For early returns from the first set of legislative elections throughout France show a virtual landslide for de Gaulle's party, the Union for the New Republic. In a vote which has stunned last week's political prognosticators, the Gaullists have won a majority of the contests so far, sweeping aside such notable opposition figures as former Premier Paul Reynaud and former Premier Pierre Mendes-France.

The Gaullist party is indeed a relative newcomer to the political scene in France and could hardly have hoped to win so many seats without a strong personal plea from de Gaulle. Yet it is unlikely that the President's personal appeal alone can account for such a sweeping victory. The opposition, it seems, might learn a lesson from the vote, since it seems to have confirmed de Gaulle's criticism that the parties offered nothing to the voters of France except more confusion.

Still, it must be noted that while de Gaulle has repeatedly called for the *regrouping* of the old-line parties, he has not ever called for their *dissolution.* In that sense the democratic system in France is not threatened. Contrary to widespread use of the epithet, moreover, de Gaulle is not a dictator. It is correctly pointed out that whereas he has had ample opportunities to assume classic dictatorial powers, he has in fact eschewed them all. If there is a par-

THIS WEEK

EDITORIALS

243 Cuba: Principles and Facts
244 Elections in France
245 Non-alignment
245 No Rest for the Weary

ARTICLES, FEATURES

246 Four Wins and a Miss
by James O'Gara
247 National Politics at Midterm
by Walter Dean Burnham
251 Americans in the Kibbutzim
by Ann Morrissett

VERSE

253 Flirt
by John Updike

DEPARTMENTS

254 The Stage
by Richard Gilman
255 The Screen
by Philip T. Hartung
256 Correspondence
260 Books

THE COMMONWEAL
232 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.

EDWARD S. SKILLIN, *Editor*
JAMES O'GARA, *Managing Editor*
DANIEL CALLAHAN, *Associate Editor*
WALTER ARNOLD, JR., *Assistant Editor*

RICHARD GILMAN, *Drama Critic*
PHILIP T. HARTUNG, *Movie Critic*
ROBERT BARRAT, *Paris*
GUNNAR D. KUMLIEN, *Rome*
MICHAEL P. FOGARTY, *Great Britain*

JOHN BRUBAKER, *Advertising Manager*

Second-class postage paid at Norwalk, Conn. Printed in the U.S.A. and published weekly, except biweekly from mid-July to mid-September, at 116 Main St., Norwalk, Conn., by The Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc., 232 Madison Ave., New York 16, N.Y. MUrray Hill 3-2042. Copyright © 1962 The Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc. U.S. and Canada, $8 a year. Foreign, $10. Single copies 25¢.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

iamentary crisis in France, it is not primarily one of le Gaulle's making. It has been brought about, as evidenced in the present vote, by the failure of even he united Opposition Parties to provide a viable political, social and economic program for France n face of an emerging New Europe.

To the extent that the stunning Gaullist victory will force the Opposition Parties to reconsider their nited front, it will have been a salutary thing for France. No one would like to see the Gaullists hold a majority of seats in the Parliament (that would in fact be unprecedented in modern French history). But even that would not necessarily signal the end of the Republic, as dour prophets would have us believe. For the *voice* of the opposition has not been stilled by the *vote*. If anything, the vote will give the parties breathing-time for a stronger voice in the future.

In the meantime de Gaulle is, after all, committed to the Republican form of government. Yet he has argued that France needs something greater: in face of a uniting Europe France needs, for herself *and* for Europe, to repossess *une grandeur historique*. Who is to say that he is wrong? Who is to say that the strong vote of confidence evidenced in the current elections may not help France achieve that greatness? For the moment, then, dire prophecies for France's future based upon the current election results remain unconvincing.

Non-alignment

UP UNTIL a month ago nationalism for the various peoples of India was comparatively uncomplicated. It was anti-Western because of the colonial past. But it also involved disassociation from either of the two major rival power blocs—not only because India's needs of assistance from every quarter were so vast but also because India realized how little it had available for developing decisive military strength.

Mr. Nehru, who manifested these views, is the idol of the Indian masses. There were occasions when his non-alignment led to a disturbing indifference toward suppressions of human freedom such as took place in Hungary in 1956. Most of the time Mr. Nehru assumed that he had cordial relations all round, with nations on both sides of the Curtain. Hence India experienced shock not only due to the unprovoked invasion by the Chinese, but also due to the lack of even moral support from the Russian satellites, or from Tito, Nasser and certain others in the Afro-Asian world. Soviet assurances about future delivery of twelve jets and the MIG factory contracted for hardly match the food and munitions already received from the West.

Enthusiasm of the Indian people is mounting to prosecute what Nehru now calls an "all-out war." Many are eagerly volunteering for army duty, or to sacrifice jewelry, savings or part of their meager pay. There can be no question about the national determination to resist. Yet the strongest contingents of the Indian army are pinned down on the border of a Pakistan whose own nationalism is so intense that it feels aggrieved because Britain and the United States did not choose this moment of India's peril to insist on a solution of the bitterly disputed Kashmir question.

Perception by India that its most loyal friends are in the West does not mean that India will, or should, abandon its policy of non-alignment. It will doubtless conceive of this policy in new terms. It will fight the Chinese Communists in desperate self-defense without thought of the worldwide confrontation of Communism with the free world; all India's efforts need to be focused on its struggle for survival.

Even if New Delhi should now manifest little more enthusiasm for the cause of the West than during its first fifteen years of independent existence, its self-defense, economic growth and political strength, which are now so gravely threatened, are of vital moment to the free world, East and West.

No Rest for the Weary

THERE IS so much mind in the popular magazines lately that is hard to read for relaxation any more. Even monthlies which had formerly been content to indulge the reader in armchair travel or sartorial fantasy must now exact their pound of mind. Perhaps, if the trend continues sufficiently long, we will have no further need of universities. The magazine-rack in every home will constitute a research library. It is difficult to tell what *light reading* is any longer, since the journals which formerly catered to it have "gone serious." You cannot pick up a weekly review without an overt or covert editorial invitation to "stretch the mind" or "sharpen the intellect" or otherwise indulge in a mixture of metaphors.

It is not to be supposed that we are anti-intellectual if we oppose such efforts at wholesale mental boot-strapping. (Perhaps that is what the magazines would have us believe.) It is just that in the interest of a rich and varied world (we are committed to pluralism), we would like to maintain some distinction between work and leisure. We have always thought that serious thought was work and would merely enjoy a little rest from our labors in leisurely reading. If this alarming trend continues, The Commonweal will be forced to appear in comic book form. Fair Warning!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Four Wins and a Miss

BY NOW almost every commentator in the country has had his say on the off-year elections. Two tag-ends still interest me, however: the G.O.P. victories in the South and the exit of Richard Nixon, not laughing.

Republican Congressional gains in the South were a bright spot for the party. The G.O.P. picked up four new House seats in the South and managed to scare the life out of many more Democratic office-holders who found themselves in nip-and-tuck, cliff-hanging contests for the first time in their lives.

All this does not mean that a Republican tide in the South is in the making for 1964, of course. G.O.P. strength is growing, but it is still concentrated in relatively small pockets. Nonetheless, there are definite indications that it is now becoming respectable to be a Republican in the once-solid South.

For my part, I think this is a very good thing, not because I am a G.O.P. partisan but because I believe in the two-party system, for the South as well as for the North. But at the same time I must also admit that there were disturbing aspects to the G.O.P.'s most recent gains below the Mason-Dixon line.

Too many Southern G.O.P. votes in this election seem to have been prompted purely and simply by antagonism to the racial policies of the national Democratic party, and this is what is bothersome. The South needs healthy political competition; it does not need competition to see who can out-Faubus Faubus. Yet this is precisely what too many Republican candidates seem to have tried to do.

If I were a national leader of the Republican party, I would worry about this, for the welfare of my party as well as of the nation. When it comes to the race issue, the Democrats are for all practical purposes two parties. And yet, although it may be unfair, I think they can get away with this schizophrenia in a way that Republicans can not, simply because the Democratic split is of such long standing. If Republicans in the South seek office by being more pro-segregation than Southern Democrats, they may pick up a few Southern seats, but they will almost certainly sink their national candidates. So, at any rate, it looks to me; I only hope G.O.P. leaders see it the same way.

I don't know who the clown in this election was, but for me at least the tragic figure was Richard Nixon. Again, my feelings do not arise out of partisanship; Mr. Nixon was never one of my favorite political figures. The thing is, though, that you don't like to see a man destroy himself, and this is what Nixon did.

Coming from a man who enjoyed the support of a large majority of California's newspapers, Mr. Nixon's parting blast at the press was incredible. For a man who had national political aspirations it was suicidal not because of what he said about the press but because of what he revealed about himself. The man who always counseled others not to do anything important when under stress or overtired ignored his own advice and delivered himself of an overwrought, self-pitying tirade that shook up even his most ardent supporters—so much so that two important newspapers which endorsed him in 1960 have since expressed the view that it is a good thing that he did not win the Presidency.

Why did Nixon do it? I suspect that when he charged the press with "kicking Nixon around" he meant every word of it, and in a way he was right. Nixon, I think, has always been a far more complex figure than he appears. On the surface, he is folksy, affable, a perfect type for the aggressively pleasant, go-getting insurance salesman or the rising star of the Junior Chamber of Commerce. Underneath, though, he is by all reports introspective, sensitive, given to self-doubts.

Most people, I think, never really warmed up to Richard Nixon, including newspapermen in California and elsewhere, and this was Nixon's tragedy. He wanted to be loved, but he was lucky to be liked and, like Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman*, he was almost never *well* liked.

Before I start to hear from Nixon partisans, let me say I do not think this was because of his role in the Hiss case. The fact is that most Americans were predisposed to Mr. Nixon for his role in the Hiss case. In that instance they thought he served his country well, as he did on several other notable occasions. But they also resented the suggestion that to be anti-Nixon was to be pro-Hiss, and the fact that the suggestion appeared so frequently provides a good clue to Mr. Nixon's fatal weakness.

Early on in his political career, Mr. Nixon learned to use the technique of the ugly innuendo, of which the distribution of "pink sheets" bearing his opponent's voting record was the best example, and the habit died hard. The truth is, I think, that there were two Nixons, the politician and the statesman, and an election almost inevitably brought out the worst in him.

With some, at any rate, Nixon's style went down well enough in the feverish McCarthyite climate of the fifties; in 1962 his technique seemed terribly obvious and dated. It is an odd thing to say about such a young and in many ways such a gifted man, but in a very real sense I think Mr. Nixon failed to keep up with the times. In that sense his embarrassingly revealing "final" press conference only put a period to an era that was already finished.

JAMES O'GARA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unhealthy Party Decay?

National Politics at Midterm

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM

HE BALLOTS have been cast, the captains and kings ave departed for the moment, and the political pun- its are left amidst the post-election debris to sort out hat it all means. This is at best no easy task: Ameri- an politics is the most localized in the western world. loreover, the centrifugal forces in our politics are given ieir greatest scope when, as in 1962, iere is no presidential race which can :nd unity to the politicians' efforts.



The gross results of the 1962 election, t least on their face, seem amply to con- rm this crazy-quilt pattern of American olitics. They suggest as well that the po- tical status quo was changed exception- lly little. The Democrats apparently have ained four seats in the Senate and lost wo in the House—a performance which s generally conceded to be remarkable for party in control of the White House, but ne which is not likely to lessen President Kennedy's legislative difficulties to any narked degree. On the other hand, the Republicans, hough showing few if any gains in the number of gov- rnorships under their control, have markedly improved heir position in key states through the victories of George Romney, William Scranton, and Nelson Rocke- eller. The election also produced more than its share of surprises: the defeats of Republican Senators Cape- hart of Indiana and Wiley of Wisconsin; the Republi- an near-misses in the South, especially in the Alabama enatorial race; the extreme closeness of many of the key races; and the remarkable Democratic showing in upper New England, which netted the party two gov- ernorships and a Senate seat in ordinarily rock-ribbed Republican territory.

But appearances are deceptive. Behind the apparent cross-purposes of the election there were significant uniformities at work; and there is a strong undercurrent of change just below the surface of the apparently con- tinuing status quo. Attention might be paid at the out- set to the nature and possible significance of the Re- publican gubernatorial victories in Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania.

What do George Romney, William Scranton and Nelson Rockefeller have in common? All three of these men are wealthy, and at least two of them have in- herited an ascribed, secure position in the upper stratum of American society. All of them are in what might be called the "left wing" of the Republican Party. They are "so- phisticated" or progressive conservatives, flexible in their thinking, broadly cosmo- politan in their domestic and international outlook and well in tune with the temper of the times in which they live.

Indeed, all three of these men stand a great deal closer to President Kennedy and many of his leading advisers than to most of their own party's leadership, espe- cially in Congress. They, along with such Democrats as Kennedy, Senator Clark of Pennsylvania, Averell Harriman and others mark the emergence of something which is rather new in our politics—the entrance onto the American political stage of members of the industrial gentry and the displacement of the older breed of middle-class and professional politicians in both parties.

In short, the social system of America's industrial order is now finally producing a broadly ecumenically- minded, permanent ruling gentry. And that gentry has produced individuals who are willing and able to com- pete successfully at the polls. A new national aristocracy is thus entering the political arena in force for the first time since the Jacksonian revolution destroyed the old, and the results of the 1962 election, like those of its immediate predecessors, make it clear that its scions make attractive candidates in the politically decisive metropolitan areas, whatever their nominal party affilia- tion is.

IT WAS, notably, the progressive conservatives who were the big Republican winners in 1962, if we except the gains which were made by the party in the South. Yet the problems of cohesion with which this develop- ment confronts the Republican Party in a centrist po-

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, a member of the faculty at Kenyon College, writes frequently for this magazine on politics and national affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

litical culture are many and serious. A full appreciation of this Republican problem emerges when we examine the G.O.P. gains in the state races in conjunction with its extremely poor performances in the congressional races.

If it be true that the newer sophisticated conservatives were among this year's major winners, it is equally apparent that they speak for a small minority of the party in Congress, and particularly in the House of Representatives. It is in Congress that the older version of Republicanism, often a kind of Americanized Manchester liberalism, tends to prevail. This older Republicanism is in some respects virtually the antithesis of that espoused by the progressive conservatives. The latter reflect broadly cosmopolitan, flexible and pragmatic views about such issues as internal and foreign Communism or the role of government in the nation's economic and social life.

By contrast, the congressional G.O.P. often appears in the main to be parochial, narrow, inflexible, quasi-ideological in outlook; it tends to be cool to the social reforms already in existence and militantly opposed to any extension of them, capable of extreme overreaction to Communism at home and abroad, and strangely insensitive to the claims of the Negro to his constitutional birthright. Moreover, both the image and the reality of the congressional Republican Party as a party of opposition *per se* have been markedly strengthened in the past few years by the tightening of the conservative coalition in the House.

In view of this negative performance, it is not altogether surprising that the long-term trend toward erosion of Republican strength in Congress, which Louis Bean noted as long ago as 1948, has shown signs of acceleration in recent years; and these signs appear to have been abundantly confirmed by the 1962 election returns. Taking the period from 1920 through 1962, the average loss of seats by the party in control of the White House has been six in the Senate and forty-two in the House. Yet, rivaling only the exceptional election of 1934, the Republicans failed by ten to reach this norm in the Senate, and by forty in the House. Finally, if this long-term tendency of the congressional G.O.P. to lose about five per cent of the total number of seats in each house continues unchecked for another decade, the Democratic Party as now constituted will be able to look forward to *normal* majorities of two to one or better in both Houses, and the conservative coalition itself will have become a minority, even in the House of Representatives.

Whether this trend will in fact continue is, of course, lost in the mists of contingency. There are, however, indications of a continuing rightward displacement among most of the blocs of voters who support the G.O.P. It is also worth noting that a kind of "feedback" process seems to be at work which does not bode well for the position of the Republican Party in Congres Normally both parties will be in control of a sul stantial number of marginal or "swing" districts. Thes serve an invaluable function, for usually such distric are marginal because they contain a close balance (political forces and the men who represent them ar more often than not, likely to be moderate in their ou look. Appeal to the centrist "swing vote" presumabl makes this necessary.

However, this old rule of politics seems to be show ing signs of disappearance in recent elections. Th Democratic landslide of 1958 forced the G.O.P. bac upon its solid redoubts, and it was not surprising tha the first organizational consequence of the party's de feat was the replacement of the relatively moderat Joe Martin as House minority leader by Charles Ha leck, a much more inflexible conservative. The interest ing point, however, is that the Republican gains c twenty or so in 1960 did not for the most part bring new contingent of party moderates into Congress, a might have been expected. The new men were gen erally militant conservatives.

The net effect of these changes has been to increase and perhaps greatly to increase, the factional tension within the Republican Party. Its natural leadership i presidential campaigns comes of necessity from the pro gressive conservatives of the Northeast. The reasons fo this are obvious and ineluctable. If the G.O.P. wishe to win the Presidency, it must campaign in a presi dential—that is, nationwide—constituency. Consequentl it must accept the fact that the broad center of Ameri can political opinion stands far to the left of that voice by the congressional party. It is precisely here that th increasingly militant, quasi-ideological rigidity whic many members of the Republican right in Congress and elsewhere seem to be displaying takes on added sig nificance.

In the United States a party is almost literally a house of many mansions. But these mansions can be preserved as a single house only if there is a broad flexibility and willingness to compromise. These are characteristics rarely found in ideologues, and in the present basically conservative posture of American politics as a whole, the right wing of the Republican Party—along with



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ome of its Dixiecratic allies—seems to have a near-nonopoly on ideological politics. Since it seems quite ikely that the next G.O.P. presidential nominee will be lrawn from one of the successful progressive-conserva-ive governors of 1962, and since the policy gap be-ween this wing of the party and the congressional ›arty has rarely if ever been wider than it is now, the east that can be said is that the 1964 Republican con-'ention may well contain enough explosive matter to ›low the party wide open.

THIS HINT of a prospective party realignment brings is to one of the most significant of all the uniform pat-erns revealed by the 1962 election: the continuing de-ay of sectionalism and traditional regional political ›ommitments among the electorate. This decay is now ›o well advanced that sectionalism in its older sense is ›eing fully liquidated. The policy consequences of this lissolution of sectionalism are so momentous—so po-ential revolutionary—that the imagination strains in trying to form a picture of what a completely national-ized American politics would look like.

This erosion of sectionalism can be seen everywhere in the country in the wake of the 1962 election—in upper New England, the Middle West and the border states. But the most dramatic and important break with the past is taking place in the South. Here, excluding Kentucky, the Republicans picked up four seats in the House and came within close striking distance of victory in half a dozen others. They ran respectable statewide races in South Carolina and Texas, and just missed unseating Senator Lister Hill in Alabama. Their gains in the South mean in effect that the congressional G.O.P. has a discernible Southern wing for the first time in this century. It seems likely that the development of this indigenous "Confederate" Southern Republicanism will serve to give the Goldwater faction of the party even more leverage in Congress than it had before. This in turn is likely to drive the wedge between the progressive-conservatives and the fundamentalists within the party deeper and deeper.

Moreover, these Southern developments have already had an effect which is not reflected in the gross results, that is, the strengthening of the "new frontiersmen" and the weakening of the Southern conservatives within the Democratic Party in the House. The overwhelming majority of Democratic conservative-coalition congressmen, of course, come from the Southern and border states, though the latter in particular often return liberal Democrats as well. Taken in conjunction with several victories scored by Southern moderate Democrats over supporters of the coalition in the party primaries, the Kennedy forces have made a net gain of perhaps ten seats within the House Democratic Party. For their part, the coalition bloc in the Southern wing has lost about an equal number of seats. In other words, to a slight but significant degree factional conflict within the Democratic Party has been replaced by cleavages between Democrats and Republicans.

This will not, in all probability, make the prospects of success for the Administration's major domestic programs appreciably brighter in the 88th Congress than they were in the 87th. But it should betoken a decided liberalization of the House Democratic Party as a whole, especially in view of its substantial gains on the West Coast. Most important of all, the results in the South and in the country as a whole reflect a continuing slippage of both parties toward a realignment along conservative-liberal lines. The replacement of Southern conservatives by non-Southern liberals within the Democratic Party reduces its dilemmas of cohesion. But Republican gains in territory which is becoming as receptive to the doctrines of its right-wing as is the South will most probably increase the internal tensions within the G.O.P.

On the whole, then, President Kennedy has good reason to be cheered by the results of the 1962 election. The Republicans, however, have equally ample cause for concern: the progressive-conservatives of the metropolitan areas because of the imminent G.O.P. breakthrough in the South, which can only benefit the Goldwater wing of the party, and the militant conservatives because of the party's weakening grip on Congress. It might almost be said that the stage is set for the long-awaited realignment of parties.

THIS ANALYSIS would be incomplete if it failed to include two additional straws in the wind. The first of these—and the 1962 election tends to confirm what was noted about the 1960 election by such observers as Theodore White—is that not only sectionalism but *all* traditional voting alignments have rather suddenly become unglued. This fluidity applies not only to the ex-solid South but also to that great coalition of ethnic groups, city machines and the underprivileged which was put together by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930's. Clearly, as White has intimated, the suburbanization of American metropolitan populations and the relatively high level of affluence enjoyed today by most of the politically active public has served, along with the assimilation of the ethnic populations, to deprive the New Deal coalition of much of its vitality. Suburbanites seem increasingly willing to support Republican or Democratic candidates if they bear the mark of the new sophisticated conservatism. Many people of all kinds of ethnic backgrounds, even in the central cities themselves, are now clearly prepared to support certain kinds of Republican candidates.

The result, inevitably, is to blur the once-sharp lines of political conflict. It also partially supplants the old political cleavages of the 1930's with a new cleavage. This new cleavage seems to have at its roots a cultural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than strictly economic antagonism. It is an antagonism arising, on one hand, between a kind of "newer America" associated with the polyglot metropolitan centers, the new and dependent middle class, the exploding population of the West and the industrial gentry; and, on the other, an "older America" composed of such elements as the white South, Main Street, those who continue to adhere to essentially agrarian values, and the determinedly older-middle-class leadership of the congressional Republican Party.

As 1960 showed and 1962 confirmed, the "two Americas" are in very nearly equal balance at present. Yet it has been suggested that there is a hint in the 1962 election results that this deadlock will at last be terminated in the not distant future. But it should also be pointed out that such a possible breakthrough is running a close race with the tendency of both parties—especially their presidential wings—to converge at the middle of the political road. The outcome of this race in policy terms may not be the long-awaited triumph of the "liberals," but their achievement of breakthrough in Congress at the moment when that victory will be stripped of most of its potential political significance.

The second disturbing factor in the aftermath of the 1962 election and its recent predecessors is the obvious, and continuing, decay of party as a frame of reference for voter decision at the top levels of elective offices. This is paralleled by the increasing tendency among decisive segments of the electorate to "vote the man, not the party"—to vote for personalities rather than issues. There were a number of races in 1962 in which the winning candidates virtually ignored their nominal party affiliations in their campaign literature and advertising; and the number of such instances seems on the whole to have increased markedly in the past decade. Another aspect of this same tendency is the rapidly mushrooming pattern of split-ticket voting among the electorate at large, a pattern especially evident in 1962.

What is happening seems quite clear. The voters are evidently in the process of endorsing the very important anti-partisan elements in our political culture.

MOST POLITICAL scientists would, one suspects, agree with the proposition that this decay of party as a reference point for the average citizen's voting decision is not a manifestation of health in the American polity. The function of party in the modern industrialized state is, at least in its ideal form, to formulate issues and programs in a principled way, and to give non-elites the only substantial chance they have to influence the political system through a genuine choice between visible political alternatives. Ideally it serves as a kind of active transmission belt between the political consciousness of non-elites—a consciousness which it partly shapes—and the machinery of governmental decision-making.

But two things are quite clear about this model. In the first place, the only parties which have even chance of approaching such a model in the context o modern concentrates of industrial and social organiza tion are mass-based, nationally organized parties pos sessing a high degree of internal coherence and dis cipline. The British parties are the rather trite example Secondly, American major parties have never evolve into this kind of 20th-century political organizatior Moreover, there is no clear evidence that, even witl moderate party realignment, they can or will do so.

It is not accidental that both European and America observers of our political life have pointed out that it i more thoroughly dominated by the middle and busi ness classes than in any other part of the advanced in dustrial western world, nor that Americans have th highest levels of non-voting in the world, particularly among the lower classes of the population. The Ameri can party, as it is currently organized and constituted is singularly ineffective as a means of providing mean ingful political choices to non-elites in general and t the lower strata of the society in particular.

There are more than a few grounds for the belief tha the nationalization of our politics is destroying the olde localized, middle-class American party organizations There are, however, no clear grounds for hope that thi process of destruction will clear the decks for the emergence of newer, more relevant forms of the politica party. Into the void which has thus been created steps the young political outsider with elite connections and an illustrious name, the sophisticated conservative of ascribed wealth and social position, and the supposedly a-political military hero. Non-elites, reassured by the folklore of our political culture that their vote does have meaning, often instinctively know that, at least for them, it does not. They seem to respond either by voting for personalities or by withdrawing altogether into an alienated rejection of political life itself. In such a situation everybody—or to speak more accurately, nearly everybody—loses.

The great enigmas which the results of the 1962 election leave behind, then, are an integral part of the broader enigmas of contemporary American politics. The basic question really is, which road will American politics take in the years ahead? Will our politics evolve into a pure contest of notables, where the political issues arising out of the continuing dislocations in our evolving social system are denied a meaningful place in the political forum? Will the form of voting be preserved while its substance is deprived of significant content? Or will the visible trend toward party realignment and the breakup of traditional partisan alignments at last make possible the emergence of forms of political organization which have genuine relevance to the contemporary world. The most that can be said at the moment is that the election of 1962 has left this basic question open.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Americans in the Kibbutzim

ANN MORRISSETT

MORE THAN a decade ago hundreds of idealistic young Americans were packing up their guns and Bibles—like their European antecedents who had pioneered in America—and setting off for the Promised Land of Israel. Many of them, being children of Jewish immigrants to America, didn't actually have pioneering American ancestors from the gun-and-Bible days, but they did have some of the same notions which fired a number of early Americans to seek religious freedom or start utopian communities. Thus these young Americans headed for the *kibbutzim* of Israel, the communal settlements started by the earlier European settlers in the arid wastelands of Palestine.

With the new State of Israel established, the kibbutz symbolized the beginning of a new life: the return to the land, the brotherly sharing of goods, the renewal of Jewish life—and the defense of "independence" regained, for most of the *kibbutzim* were situated on Israel's much-disputed borders.

Where are these Americans today, and what has happened to the kibbutz dream?

First, it must be said that many of the young Americans who went have stayed: they married, settled in, and raised families which are now the backbone of the *kibbutzim*. Where tents were pitched, cabins were built and cement cottages now nestle into a lush landscape where healthy children run and yell (maybe they are a little *too* American, some feel).

Second, however, many Americans went back to the United States. Either the life of the kibbutz was not all they had dreamed, or they had come only temporarily, in order to have the experience of living on one and to make some contribution.

Third, many went to live in other Israeli communities, or cities. In Haifa, in Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv, and in the smaller towns and *moshavim* (where living is private, but marketing cooperative), one runs into Americans who started out on *kibbutzim* but left after a year or two—or sometimes after many years. They too either found kibbutz life not for them, or in some cases not suitable for pursuing their particular interests or professions.

More Americans have come to replace the vanishing "kibbutzniks," but not in quite the same spirit or numbers. Today there are some two thousand Americans in Israel's *kibbutzim*, whose total populations are something under one hundred thousand. They are still an idealistic and intelligent lot, and hard, down-to-earth workers. Some of them date from the "early days," before the 1948 War of Independence; many are those who came soon after, pitching tents and establishing new *kibbutzim* literally overnight in barren areas. The rest, trickling in through the past decade, found the groundwork laid.

Things are easier now: there are not only concrete homes, but also schools, cultural centers, orchestras and theater groups. One kibbutz has its own broadcasting system, by which *haverim* (kibbutz members) not only keep up with world news and culture, but also broadcast their own news and display local talents. Many of the early settlers look back nostalgically to the "good old days"—but many look forward to even greater conveniences: the bourgeois revolution may be said to have set in.

Even in the first rugged settlements, the kind of American who migrated there usually had a few relics of civilization with him—not only the Bible (almost a literal handbook for this part of the world), but very likely Shakespeare and a few of the New Prophets like Marx, Freud, and Einstein.

TODAY, libraries in the homes of American "kibbutzniks" are impressive in quantity and quality. Almost invariably they include a number of American classics—Melville, Emerson, Hawthorne—plus sociological and anthropological works of writers like Mead and Riesman; novels by Mailer and Jones, Waugh and Huxley. But private collections don't need to be large; the kibbutz library is available to all, of course, and people often contribute their own books, except for specialized ones they may personally need, to community use. Some *kibbutzim* had great discussions in their first years over whether or not anyone should have personal libraries at all—or for that matter any sort of "personal" luxury like radios, even watches, which might not be available to all.

Americans, particularly, presented this problem, coming as they did not as refugees but as volunteers, often with parents or relatives eager to provide them with all the comforts of home. As the *kibbutzim* have become more affluent, however, the controversy has faded—though it still exists in many places on such subjects as private refrigerators or motor scooters. Most kibbutz homes now have their own radios and record players,

ANN MORRISSETT is an American writer who recently returned from Europe and the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while a few *kibbutzim* have solved the distribution problem by installing a public address system. This cuts down the variety of choice (not great in the Middle East in any case), but it has produced worthy side effects, such as the aforementioned home broadcasting station, and, working two ways, a safer method of night watch in children's dorms, enabling the most distant cries and coughs to be heard.

Not all American "kibbutzniks" are in the more flourishing settlements, however. In the Negev—Israel's equivalent of the Far West—hundreds of Americans are still helping build up newer *kibbutzim*. Here you can still find some of the bleak wasteland that is now seen only in ten-year-old photographs nostalgically kept by the "old settlers" in the developed *kibbutzim*. But even in the Negev, among sand dunes and cactus, there are modern little houses under construction, often resembling American motel bungalows of the more attractive variety; many of these are being financed by a loan scheme sponsored by the Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel.

ACTUAL construction of homes is no longer done by "kibbutzniks"—the economy is now sufficiently developed and specialized for this to be impractical—but it is supervised by a member of the kibbutz; and the construction workers, like the kibbutz workers, are all fellow members of Histadrut, Israel's umbrella labor organization. (Arab workers have in recent years been admitted into Histadrut, and also have been taken on as extra laborers on kibbutz farms and factories, a problem which is still not settled in the minds of "kibbutzniks" who do not believe in hired labor.)

Though the basic plan of Israel's two hundred and fifty-odd *kibbutzim* is very much the same everywhere —with a common dining hall and laundry, small private one- or two-room dwellings—there are some differences among them. In most *kibbutzim*, children not only study and play together, but also share sleeping quarters, though they are normally with their parents an hour or two after school every day. In a few places this has been changing, recently, to the smaller family system more common in the West, and housing is being expanded to include bedrooms for children to sleep at home.

Although the first kibbutz established at Degania in 1909 always had children sleeping at home, most subsequent ones did not, and the more recent trend toward this situation is considered to be due to "American" influences. What the advantages and disadvantages may be, it is difficult to say. Kibbutz children generally seem quite independent and secure, whether they sleep in the room next to their parents or a few houses away in the care of a known *havera* designated for the job. As it was put by one young American husband I visited in a Negev kibbutz which is changing over, "If it makes my wife happier to have the kids sleep at home, that' the important thing with me."

Another difference among the *kibbutzim* is tha some are entirely agricultural and some have little fac tories. There are *kibbutzim* in the Upper Negev pro ducing everything from hoes to hammer heads an teaspoons—even exporting some to America. Not every one is entirely happy about these departures from pur "on the land" activities, but—here again perhaps a American influence—they do often help put the kibbut on a more practical footing.

For Americans accustomed not only to comforts an conveniences, but also to the relatively easy acquisitio of money, the kibbutz was indeed a change, becaus here there has been no money whatever. That is, mone seldom changes hands within the kibbutz itself, sinc there is no need for it. Necessary goods and services ar provided as part of the total work program, and jus as some people work in the fields, so some work in th school, the laundry, the supply houses, the dining hal and kitchen. Those who have lived in *kibbutzim* a while sometimes have a rude awakening on visits to city shops and restaurants: they often start to walk ou without even thinking of paying. Perhaps the waitresse or waiters are understanding: they have no doubt spen some time in a kibbutz too, either in army service o in their earlier days in Israel. But all this is changing too; *kibbutzim* are increasingly making money avail able to members for wider purchasing choices or city trips, and city folks are getting meaner. Where once even in the cities, a stranger was "friend" (*haver*), now a stranger is "Miss" or "Mr.", and a "kibbutznik" is not automatically an honored guest.

Increasingly, the *kibbutzim* have become tourist stop offs and symbolic show-places. Some are even starting inns or motel-like settlements for tourists in order to make money for the kibbutz (and to minimize the free loading). Many transients come to the *kibbutzim* for a few days or months, some pushing on, some remaining to apply for membership. These include itinerant writers like myself (but I worked!), African and Asian students sponsored by the Israeli government and idealistic young Americans and Europeans seeing the world and drawn by the idea of the kibbutz, as well as frequent state visitors like Prime Ministers and Members

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

f Parliament and young couples looking for the "good ɔmmunity" where they can raise their children. There re also workshop groups sponsored by Zionist youth rganizations, via which young Americans and Canadiɲs experience kibbutz life intermingled with study roups and tours for nearly a year. Relatively few of ɲese, however, have returned to live in *kibbutzim*.

"But this is like Communism!" one young American isitor to a kibbutz exclaimed. This can depend on efinition, of course: to many East European immi;rants it does look like more regimentation than they are to get involved in again. To many German Jews t may even resemble certain aspects of concentration amps. To others it represents both the freedom and ecurity they feel they want out of life. Many of the Americans whose rugged individualism is not unlike hat of America's early settlers will gladly explain the ɔasic differences they see between the centralized, ɯthoritarian society usually identified as political Comɲunism, and these small communities of two hundred ɔ six hundred people (a few are larger, though this is ɲot encouraged) who settle and remain voluntarily, runɲing their own affairs in a way that is something be:ween a New England town meeting, an early Christian (or perhaps pre-Christian Essene) community, and a Robert Owen-type early American "utopia."

The fact remains, however, that the new immigrants —especially those from East European and Arab countries—are not flocking to the *kibbutzim*, and the government has to do some selling even of the moshav systems. Hebrew primers (out of which I was learning on a kibbutz) extol the virtues of kibbutz and moshav life over city living, and the political parties preach it. Yet, increasingly, even the kibbutz-based politicians and professionals have town houses.

THERE ARE varieties of political opinion within and among the *kibbutzim*, ranging from religious conservatism through the social democracy of Ben-Gurion (Mapai party) to the leftist (Mapam). Each group has its own *kibbutzim* and youth organizations, seeing the basic kibbutz unit as part of its own larger social and political pattern. In the mixed economy which is now Israel's, the kibbutz seems to fit in well as a sound sector of the economy (thirty-five per cent of the agricultural production, though comprising only about four and one-half per cent of the total population), and as both proving ground and inspiration for the rest of the population. Some feel that they will no longer expand now that the necessity for the kibbutz no longer exists, that one must be too idealistic (or security-seeking) to remain. Others, in or out of *kibbutzim*, feel that they are a permanent and vital part of the Israeli scene, and will still play a large role in eventually settling the Negev.

There is a sentimentality about the old kibbutz that is almost like an old college tie in America: editors, tradesmen, even bus drivers often speak fondly of—and go to visit—the *kibbutzim* where they once lived. Army youth must spend part of their service "on the land," usually in the border *kibbutzim*. A good many of Israel's leaders—including Prime Minister Ben Gurion, and the Speaker of the Parliament come from *kibbutzim*.

Clearly it is not a life suited to everyone at all stages; people come and go, but it is this freedom of movement in Israel which provides part of its vitality—as well as many of its headaches. It is a limited freedom of movement, of course: limited for members of the *kibbutzim*, limited for the Arab population and limited for many by housing shortages. All Israelis suffer from the feeling of limitation they have owing to their closed borders, and from the high cost of getting to places they *can* go. But essentially it is a mixed, varied, miniature but relatively free society for the majority of Israelis. The two thousand Americans living in *kibbutzim* are only a minority of the twelve thousand or so Americans in Israel. Yet it is, perhaps, safe to say that this minority represents some of the best aspects of American idealism and vigor —just as the *kibbutzim* represent a similar quality in the fabric of Israeli society.

The *kibbutzim* are still largely settled by people wanting to live by their communal principles—and by Americans drawn there not so much by negative necessity as by positive desire to contribute to Israel the skills and ideas which their American backgrounds had given them. Perhaps there was also a desire to recapture something of the old pioneer American spirit which we are raised on, which our television screens so greatly revere (and frequently distort). Well, there's no TV in Israel *yet* (except for a handful of sets which pick up Arab stations)—but it seems likely that when there is, there will be heated discussions in the *kibbutzim* on how to get the best and most equitable use out of it for everyone. The American "kibbutzniks," I venture to predict, will probably already be out on the roofs rigging up the antennas.

Flirt

The flirt is an antelope of flame,
igniting the plain
wherever she hesitates.
She kisses my wrist, waits,
and watches the flush of pride
absurdly kindle my eyes.
She talks in riddles,
exposes her middle,
is hard and strange in my arms:
I love her. Her charms
are those of a fine old book with half-cut pages,
bound in warm plush at her white neck's nape.

JOHN UPDIKE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STAGE

The Trouble with Repertory

THE ANNOUNCEMENT of a new repertory theater never fails to stir my flagging critic's senses. I am incurably optimistic about such things, experience having apparently taught me nothing. Anything off-center in relation to the commercial stage, anything arising from the amateur (in the right sense: disinterested obedience to perennial values, the gift seen as greater than the giver), anything that comes toward me trailing clouds of dedication or love or rebellious purity—and I bite like the hungriest, most naive fish.

Three bites a season is the usual number, and I have used up two in the last couple of weeks. That I managed to get off the hook, that I always manage to get off the hook is testimony, I hope, to the fact that my critical faculties only sleep between their encounters with real objects; in these interims I dream of a revivified theater, one of valor and special grace, and, since dreams are unable to distinguish between experience and hunger, I make noble and forgivable mistakes.

They are not of equal size. I expected a great deal more from the first production of the Writers' Stage Company than from that of the Mermaid repertory group. The former company had taken over the old Fourth Street Theater, with its ghostly reminders of the murders of Ibsen and Chekhov at the hands of David Ross, refurbished it so that it is now possible to see what is happening on stage, and proclaimed the intention of presenting unusual and substantial new dramas, the group's corporate name reinforcing the notion that the play, for a change, would be the thing.

The Mermaid people, on the other hand, merely told us they were going to do the plays of Jean Cocteau in repertory. A good idea, if not one to set John Gassner re-writing his histories. Cocteau, no giant but a continually resourceful and imaginatively untrammeled playwright, is almost never presented here these days. But what a dismal prospect is before us now: the thought of seeing *all* of Cocteau's works done the way the Mermaid ensemble is doing "Intimate Relations" is not endurable. Their work isn't Cocteau, it isn't drama or melodrama or anything recognizable, except perhaps television. That the three actresses in the company have all been prominent in that medium may not be a coincidence.

I don't think it is a coincidence either that Matt Cimber, who directed this thoroughgoing perversion of Cocteau's spirit and intention, is listed as having been the director of something called the Summer Festival of Comedy, whose program included such challenging *oeuvres* as "The Moon is Blue" and "The Tender Trap." For that is clearly the way Mr. Cimber sees Cocteau: as a writer of domestic comedy, this particular play tragic denouement being handled as an unfortunat excrescence. The melancholy cast, whose only membe with a shred of understanding of her role is Muri Williams, stumbles foolishly around on sets by Mar Ann Reed that are as far from Cocteau's hot mythi interiors as Cimber's poster-color sense of action is fror the playwright's subtle marriage of open, exclamator gesture and the occult wayward dreams that bin families together.

"P. S. 193," the first offering of the Writers' Stage com pany, is a much more complex disappointment. It isn' that David Rayfiel's play is so bad—there are dozen of far less impressive off-Broadway dramas that ge attention every season—but that it simply isn't the sor of thing anyone has really been looking for. Mixing pre tentiousness and honesty in about equal parts, it unfold a tale of "responsibility" and "commitment" which is again in equal parts, strongly derivative of the socia drama of the thirties and of Edward Albee's "Zoo Story" and *its* derivatives.

The play takes place on an Eastern college campus To the classroom of a professor of philosophy who i: a mordant, funny, self-deprecating fellow but also ar abstractionist and escapist in matters of moral commitment, comes an ex-G. I. at whose side a young pupil of the professor had died in Korea. The veteran is outraged because the philosopher had sent the boy off tc war with his ears full of stock phrases about democracy and courage and the like, and he proceeds to break intc the fortress of cant and erudition and aloof, unrisked idealism the way "The Zoo Story's" Jerry broke into his antagonist's sheathed and settled world.

Through a series of menacing actions which culminate in a climactic confrontation, the veteran forces the teacher to acknowledge his guilt, which is, by implication, the guilt we all share for our permissiveness in the face of wars that kill *others*. It is a thin and not very original thesis, and it is made especially difficult of acceptance by Mr. Rayfiel's large faults as a dramatist. He has written some fairly pungent dialogue and a few scenes of forcefulness and point, but his play suffers from what Yeats called the will's doing the work of the imagination.

For one thing, the professor is ultimately a straw man whom the soldier hasn't the slightest trouble knocking down. But more seriously, the play proceeds along two fronts which never succeed in becoming one. There is the moral drama of the two men, who represent conflicting attitudes toward responsibility and involvement, and another, domestic drama which has to do, one vaguely gathers, with the professor's remoteness from his wife. What results for the cast—an extremely uneven one, ranging from Severn Darden, who plays the teacher nervously but with some style and in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anner of Emil Jannings in "The Blue Angel," through ames Earl Jones who invests the G. I. with vast kinetic ccitement and equally vast imprecision, to Doris Belack ho is woefully inadequate as the wife—is that they are ntinually shifting from symbolic and angular modes performance to gritty, expressionistic Actors' Studio nes.

It may be noticed in the program that Miss Belack one of the founders and directors of the company. I ise an eyebrow and say no more about that. But I ould like to say that the program also contains a anifesto signed by another founder, Andre Gregory, ho directed "P. S. 193," and a great deal of what is auspicious about this beginning can be discovered here. Mr. Gregory writes some apocalyptic words about eace and nuclear destruction and the responsibility of he theater to grapple with the issues of the time. He s against materialism and for sanity. Apart from the act that this particular idea of a socially committed heater is naive and bombastic and derivative in our ircumstances, one would like to tell him, and the Writ-rs' Stage, and any new repertory companies that have lans for existing, that their first commitment should e to skill and daring and art and originality. Why go hrough the pains of birth if you are going to be as ncompetent and predictable as everybody else?

RICHARD GILMAN

THE SCREEN

Down to the Sea in Ships

IT'S HARD to say just where the new "Mutiny on the Bounty" went wrong. Perhaps the project was ill-fated from the beginning—a beginning that goes back to three years ago. But even after the filming started in 1960 in Tahiti and in Hollywood, there were troubles galore—not only with the weather, which wouldn't cooperate, but also with Marlon Brando whose lack of cooperation probably won more publicity than the historic 1789 mutiny aboard the *Bounty*. There were also changes in script, scriptwriters and directors until the costs mounted to twenty millions—give or take a couple. The finished film is a big, sprawling epic with some beautiful color photography and a story line that doesn't seem to know where it's going and is in no hurry to get there.

By no means must all the blame for the movie's faults be traced to Brando's demands and temperamental behavior, although it was no doubt Brando who insisted that the role of Fletcher Christian be the biggest thing in the picture. Again and again the camera and the action center on Christian—until the story becomes his. It must be said, however, that Brando plays this role extremely well and the character development is one of the film's chief assets. He starts out portraying the *Bounty*'s first mate as an almost foppish aristocrat of high birth who looks down his nose at the ship's captain. His attitude changes to an interest in what's going on and a concern for the men as he witnesses low-born Captain Bligh's acts of injustice and petty meanness. By the time he leads the mutiny, Christian is convinced that what he's doing is right. Although he exhibits strength and bravery as a leader, he realizes the seriousness of his crime, and afterwards be becomes moody and introspective. Much later, on Pitcairn Island, he tries, without success, to persuade the other mutineers to return to England with him and explain their position.

I don't know how much this interpretation of Fletcher Christian follows the books by Charles Nordhoff and James Norman Hall on which the script was based, but Marlon Brando's good performance and good looks succeed in making the role interesting and believable. Furthermore, this well-dressed, upper-class first mate helps to make the behavior of envious, uncouth Captain Bligh more understandable. Although Trevor Howard doesn't play Bligh with the Charles Laughton exaggeration and sinister voice that every school kid imitated after the first version came out in 1935, he is eminently successful in making Bligh a real person, not just a symbol of cruelty and sadism, or a psychopath like Captain Queeg in "The Caine Mutiny." His Bligh is a little man, over-ambitious to get ahead even at others' expense. I wish the film could have followed his experiences and career after he was set adrift with some non-mutineering sailors in a small boat. But I wouldn't want this "Mutiny" to run one minute longer. As it is, its three-hours-plus running time seems endless.

That "Mutiny" moves too slowly is probably the fault of director Lewis Milestone (I don't know how much Carol Reed directed before he left in a huff) and the film's cutters. They allowed each scene to run too long. Perhaps they were reluctant to cut out any of their elaborate footage. But I do wish the script had been better planned and a few short scenes had been included to indicate the passage of time. One hardly realizes that many years have elapsed from the film's beginning, when the *Bounty* sails from England in 1787, to its spectacular finale when the ship is burned and Christian dies.

I also wish that director Milestone had been able to establish some of the other characters with more depth. The cast is good enough, but only a few of them, other than the two leads, make an impression: Richard Harris as a long-suffering sailor who aids the mutiny, Tim Seely as a midshipman who spurs on Christian, Frank Silvera as a Tahitian who goes with the mutineers to Pitcairn, Tarita who is beautiful, but little more, as the chieftain's daughter who gives herself to Christian. Most of the very large cast are just sailors or Polynesian natives who look good in the background

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while the camera is concerned with the exciting action or the handsome dancing and swimming scenes. "Billy Budd," which has several similarities in period, themes and backgrounds, is much more successful in setting up its characters and in making us care what happens to them one way or the other. It must be said, however, that Melville's story, in spite of all its symbols, is a more personal story; and the film made from it was much better planned.

As a spectacle, "Mutiny on the Bounty" is outstanding. The *Bounty*, rebuilt for the movie and probably the last three-masted wooden vessel that will ever be built, is stunning in the gorgeous Technicolor shots of the ship at high sea; and anyone romantically inclined with sea fever will thrill to the picture's repeated views of it. The storm scene around Cape Horn is magnificent. And so are some of the scenes in Tahiti, one in particular in which the sailors join the swimming girls who are helping the fishermen. My main argument with "Mutiny on the Bounty" is that it could have been better, even in spite of all the woes that producer Aaron Rosenberg ran into. A little more judicious planning with the script, perhaps a few more scenes establishing characters and the time of events, and considerable cutting of the present over-long scenes would have set up this "Mutiny" as a worthy successor to the earlier version and as a spectacular epic that could win viewers from their TV sets.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

CORRESPONDENCE

The Cuba Crisis

Palos Park, Ill.

TO THE EDITORS: There are many points in your editorial on the Cuban blockade [Nov. 9] that I think are questionable, but there would be danger of oversimplifying subtle questions if I were to take them up in a short letter. However, the central issue must be discussed. That issue is whether this country does stand for some kind of common law among nations, some kind of distillation of Justice—whether written or not and no matter how loosely defined—which the generality of men recognize; or do we believe, as we allege of the enemy, in power only? If the former is true, then the act of war in Cuban waters is clearly a violation of our deepest principles; if the latter is true, then there is no such thing as an ideological struggle, and the conflict has no more meaning than the War of the Roses.

We cannot have it both ways. Power must be subordinate to principle. We cannot base our claim to a portion of Cuban soil on a treaty, on an agreement between sovereign nations which is rooted in the law of nations, we cannot base our willingness to defend another offensive island—Formosa—from its mainlar enemies on a treaty, and at the same time unilateral dissolve at will all the most generally accepted tene of international right. In short, we cannot stand f *Realpolitik* in blockading Cuba and stand for rule law in defending West Berlin.

To quote *Mater et Magistra* in the context of th Cuban affair might seem at first thought presumptuou but the following is not presented as a "proof" but a an illustration: "Some [heads of nations] do not hes tate to deny the existence of a code of morality whic is transcendent, absolute, universal, equally binding o all. . . . Indeed, repeated appeals to 'justice' and th 'demands of justice' by national leaders, instead c offering a possibility of understanding, frequently oc casion and intensify serious disputes. In consequenc the belief spreads that to enforce one's rights and pur sue one's interests, no other means is left than recours to violence, the root of very serious evils."

JUSTUS GEORGE LAWLE

Wheeling, Il

TO THE EDITORS: Truly, nothing succeeds like suc cess, or, at least, so your editorial of November 9 o the Cuban crisis would seem to indicate. From the firs moment when the clouds of war began to gather w liberals were all greatly concerned with the moral im plications of aggression against our little neighbor Now, however, Mr. Kennedy appears to have achieve his goal and the war clouds have disappeared for th moment, so we are all ready to approve Mr. Kennedy' "timely" move and disregard the moral implications o how this goal was achieved. We do, it is true, caution our President not to act in this way again, unless, o course, he is sure he can win.

Every proponent of power politics from Machiavell to A. Hitler has insisted that no people will question a leader's means as long as they bring success, and we have once more vindicated this contemptuous appraisal of public opinion. Indeed, it becomes increasingly evident that our concern over the fate of Cuba was based less on our regard for the rights of nations than our fear of a nuclear war. What we sought was not justice, but to save our skins. Now it appears that our skins are saved, for the moment, and we are ready to praise our savior.

It is quite true that from a purely pragmatic point of view the President's handling of the crisis was masterful. On the other hand, when faced with the crisis in Cuba, the government of the United States ignored the agencies of international law, the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and set up a blockade contrary to the customs and laws of nations to which we have always claimed to subscribe.

No objective listener could fail to be moved by the plea of the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when he asked by what right the United States did these things. The only answer could be: by the right of the stronger. For if missiles in Cuba are a threat to us, ours are no less a threat to them; and it is no use saying that we would not attack them first. Is there really then one law for small nations and another for great and powerful states?

The worst thing about abandoning a principle for expediency is that one then forfeits the right of appeal to that same principle when one's own rights are violated. The next time that Mr. Khrushchev embarks on one of his idiotic ventures into power politics, what principle of law, what right can we now appeal to, which we ourselves have not violated? Our only recourse will be to say that it is against our self-interest, thus throwing the whole thing back to the law of the jungle, which is the only law which nations never disregard. But how then can we claim to be morally superior to the system which we are fighting?

Edith Hamilton, writing on the struggle between Athens and Sparta, remarked that they did not destroy each other because one was a democracy and the other a totalitarian state, but rather because both were powerful and eager to dominate. They fought, "not because they were different, but because they were alike." Every international incident from the U-2 crisis to the present has shown how alike the United States and Russia can be.

If we really believe that everlasting peace can be achieved only by the moral conduct of nations, it is time for us to take the lead in such conduct. It is perhaps poor timing to say this while Chinese troops are pouring into the one country which has at times tried to take a moral stand. It will be objected that a strict adherence to the principles of international law will give our enemies too great an advantage. Alas, the wicked have always had an advantage. At any rate, a strict regard for the rights of all nations, including those who disagree with us, would spare us the contempt which is heaped on us for our hypocrisy in trying to give a moral justification to any line of conduct we adopt as expedient. THOMAS P. ANDERSON

Prayer and the Court

Chicago, Ill.

TO THE EDITORS: While the editors of The Commonweal deserve commendation for a relatively balanced initial reaction to the Supreme Court prayer decision [July 13] and further praise for later initiating a most important dialogue on the question, they may permit me to take exception to their unnecessary fear and concern regarding the decision's context and consequences and to propose as a possibility a different view of the matter still consistent with our many common convictions.

Despite their brief quotation of Justice Black's narrow (in the legal sense) interpretation of the decision, the editors proceeded to accuse the Court of ignoring a supposed majority vitally concerned with "the reaffirmation of our religious traditions," of allowing a "present reality completely [to] overrule tradition," of implying that the government can now under no circumstances encourage religion, of "denying any and all believers the right to let their beliefs be publicly expressed," of abandoning the "wishes of the majority to see the religious heritage of the nation recognized in . . . the public school," and of capitulating "in the face of the complaints of a minority."

While a later editorial [Sept. 28] shows greater awareness of the complexity of the issue (and it simply claims to report positions rather than take a further stand), it tends nevertheless to repeat these same fears and concerns, perhaps in a milder form. However, it does acknowledge the possibility, with some misgivings and qualifications, that "we are repairing the injustices of the past and coming closer and closer to the fulfillment of true, democratic pluralism." It is this suggestion that I would like to comment upon and finally attempt to relate to the "Jewish position" that is a primary and legitimate concern.

I would maintain that there has indeed been a growth of national conscience regarding separation in which *de facto* government support of Protestant eminence is seen as an injustice to other faiths. No denial of democratic principles is involved in the genesis and embodiment of this national conscience in a minority group, although recognition of this growth by the majority may well begin with an attitude of offense and dismay. When the initial feeling of outrage has died down, it may be recognized that such previous factual quasi-establishment has comprised three distinct components: (1) state recognition of the right of free exercise of religion; (2) state recognition of the importance of religious practice for the attainment of democratic fraternity and justice; and (3) the according, by legal ruling, to a particular denominational or inter-denominational practice a position of public preeminence. It is only the last of these elements that has rightly been condemned as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

But the principle of government acknowledgment of religious conscience and religious practice remains. It is under this aspect that all denominations enter equally as they embody the idea of transcendence of the human person relative to political society (to use Maritain's expression), whether they find the reason for transcendence in a personal God in Whom democratic moral ideals are eternally anchored or simply in a belief in the value of human nature as it overflows all national boundaries.

The Supreme Court decision in no way affects this acknowledgment of religion. It declares simply that the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A SPRING SEMESTER IN CUERNAVACA, MEXICO

Spanish Studies for College Juniors

Accredited by the College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minn.

At the Center of Intercultural Formation

Feb. 19 to May 29, 1963

ACADEMIC PROGRAM

- Intensive Spoken Spanish
- Spanish or Hispanic American Literature
- Intellectual and Social History of Latin America
- Cultural Anthropology (with field trips)

I desire more information on the Cuernavaca Program.

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

SCHOOL .....

Mail to: Director of Cuernavaca Program
College of St. Thomas
St. Paul, Minn.

solve your gift problems
by using the coupon below

for your friends who are serious readers—
a subscription to

CROSS CURRENTS a quarterly review to explore the implications of Christianity for our times

5 free reprints with GIFT SUBSCRIPTIONS (which may go to the Donor or his friend); Reprints are also available @ 25¢ ea., 5 for $1

☐ **MOUNIER:** An Air of Greater Freedom; ☐ **TILLICH:** Jewish Influences on Protestant Thought; ☐ **DELOS:** Sociology of Modern War; ☐ **BOCKENFORDE:** German Catholicism in 1933; ☐ **BERNANOS** on Luther; ☐ **FLOROVSKY** on Byzantine History; ☐ **RAHNER** on Obedience; ☐ **JOHNSON:** Public Education & Religion; ☐ **MARCEL:** The Lantern; ☐ **RICHARD-MOLARD:** Proposals on Africa; ☐ **MASCALL** on Analogy; ☐ **GOUHIER** on the Tragic; ☐ **MUNBY** on Economics

CROSS CURRENTS, 103 Van Houten Fields
West Nyack, N. Y.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

☐ Enter subscription for 1 year ($3.50); for 3 years ($9) ☐
☐ Send reprints checked above ☐ Bill me

Donor _____
☐ Check enclosed ☐ Send reprints to donor

government has no jurisdiction over the *specific content* of any religious act consistent with the common good and that the framing and promulgation by a governmental body of a specific prayer to be recited within a governmentally established organization violates the principle of separation. The Court has by no means declared itself concerning the validity of spontaneous and voluntary religious activities within public institutions. Granted that judicial clarification concerning the manner in which such spontaneous activities can legitimately occur may be reserved for the future, there is no indication that inroads have been made on the religious tradition that is inseparably linked with the democratic ideal.

What is more likely is that the future will call for *new forms* of expression of this tradition which will safeguard the basic principle of public acknowledgment of religion while purifying itself of the remnants of *de facto* establishment in which this tradition has been previously embodied. Concretely, it is conceivable that the public schools could declare various and limited holidays throughout the year, in which the principal denominations in their own symbolic and esthetic forms express the spirit of devotion that permeates their lives. Even the agnostic humanist may have his day. It is not unthinkable that, with the growth of tolerance, Jewish and Christian students may recognize interiorally that even here an unknown God receives due praise.

Regarding the role of American Jews on this issue, I believe that general Catholic avoidance of placing responsibility for the Supreme Court decision upon the traditional scapegoat has been more widespread than has generally appeared and that *America's* unfortunate attack simply obscured this fact. That another scapegoat has been found, "secularist humanism," is hardly more edifying, but at least there is less in it of personal rancor and repetition of a shameful traditional fault. What Catholics in general fail to recognize is that within whatever philosophical anti-religious context the suit may have been brought forward by some individuals, and within whatever philosophical legal framework the final decision was eventually explained (and there was no unanimity among the concurring justices on this point), the primary motivating force, perhaps not fully conscious, behind the entire situation was the spirit of the Judaeo-Christian tradition which demanded a new realization within an evolving democratic society of the idea of the primacy of the things of God over those of Caesar. From this point of view, as Maritain has explained in another context (*Man and the State*, Chapter VI), religion received not a damaging blow from the Court but a new declaration of its freedom from restriction by temporal power.

In the heat of factional controversy over this issue, in which the various denominations have succeeded in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thoroughly materializing the question (who has received more freedom from the government?—from whom has freedom been taken and to whom has it been given?), sight has been lost of the co-responsibility of Jews and Christians, in light of a common history as well as a common spiritual tradition, for a genuine progressive step in the delineation between temporal and spiritual power and prerogative.

Neither Jews nor Christians present a picture of unexampled purity in the history of the slow evolvement of this common spiritual idea. Each has its individual martyrs, Christians who refused to accede to pagan emperors, Jews who refused to bow to Christian princes. But it has been only in several hundred of the Church's two thousand years that it managed to escape entangling alliance with the powers of earth, in which it alternately forced and was forced, bent and was bent, broke and was broken. And the flight of Jews to the ghetto was based not only upon a quest for spiritual freedom but also upon their forced exclusion from the rights of socious and citizen within a pagan or Christian state.

Yet it may be a defensible position that the clarity of vision of man's transcendence of temporal power has lodged more with Jewish history than with Christian; it is not impossible that non-Christian history, in certain aspects, has embodied a Christian principle in a purer form than Christendom itself. It is no disrespect to the Catholic martyrs of the last quarter-century to hold that a comfortable co-existence with Caesar still blemishes the Catholic call to transcendence. There have been rabbis praying on the streets of Georgia, but no Catholic priests. And where are the ardent defenders of civil liberties in our Catholic parishes? They may be found fighting for federal aid to parochial schools, while their Jewish fellow-citizens strive to extend the influence of the ACLU in the interest of every minority group.

My point is perhaps too simple. It is that Jews and Christians can unite in the recent Supreme Court decision, since its inspiration stems from both traditions. What prevents this unity is the traditional historical Christian distrust of and contempt for Judaism and the almost ineradicable scars of persecution at Christian hands that force many Jews to trust the founding fathers far more than those of the Church. Papal declarations of our Semitic spirituality, papal greetings under Jewish baptismal names, may continue to give offense to many Jews until the time they are convinced that it is Catholic love for its Jewish tradition, as realized in the Messiah, that is the foundation, for Christians, of a common zeal and a common effort for the effective realization of the democratic social ideal. Until that time, dialogue must proceed at an agonizingly slow pace, yet preparing the earth for the incarnations of many words.

JOURNET KAHN

CATHOLIC ATTITUDES
a new series in JUBILEE

What do Catholics think about parochial school education, peace strikes, the rhythm method, reform of the liturgy, use of the vernacular in the Mass, the re-union of Churches?

JUBILEE will keep you informed
What should Catholics know about important developments in Protestant churches; about famous Catholic artists, theologians, scientists; the work of the Church in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America?

JUBILEE will tell you in clear, forceful reports
For alert Catholics who want to keep in touch with these and other important issues which touch on and influence their lives as Christians:

JUBILEE is the answer
And JUBILEE is stimulating to look at as well as read: a beautiful format, with outstanding photography and art, bringing the Church and her people vividly to life.

Current and coming in JUBILEE . . .
► The Lubavitchers, Hasidic Jews, joyful and mystical
► The Zoë Brotherhood: a Greek Orthodox lay apostolate
► Lively reports on the Ecumenical Council by Ned O'Gorman

A special introductory offer
Subscribe now and get seven issues of JUBILEE for only $1.98 . . . or, fifteen months for only $5 with your choice of either 1) *The Third Revolution*, Karl Stern's brilliant study of Marx, Freud and Christianity (List price $4) or, 2) *Selected Writings on the Spiritual Life* by St. Peter Damian, a new translation of a Christian classic. (List price, $4.75)

Dep't CW JUBILEE
168 East 91st Street, New York 28
☐ $5 enclosed for fifteen months of JUBILEE. Please send me free book #_____.
☐ $1.98 enclosed for a seven-month trial subscription to JUBILEE.
Name _____
Street _____
City & Zone _____ State _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Low State of Satire in America

The Anatomy of Satire. By Gilbert Highet. Princeton University Press. $5.
American Satire in Prose and Verse. Edited by Henry C. Carlisle, Jr. Random House. $6.95.
Shela. By Aubrey Menen. Random House. $3.95.
The Strange Story of the Great Whale, Also Known As Big Mac. By Erih Kos. Harcourt, Brace & World. $3.50.

by Richard McLaughlin

SATIRE, etymologically speaking, has nothing to do with satyrs. Petronius' audacious parodic romance, *Satyricon*, is perhaps responsible for the confusion. At any rate, the spelling *satira, satyra*, was not put into use, says Gilbert Highet, until long after the classical period, and this was "largely so that scholars could explain the shocking coarseness of satire by saying that it was inspired by the funny obscene satyr-folk." The name "satire" actually comes from the Latin word *satura*, which means "medley," "hotch-potch," possibly accounting for all good satires being eminently various.

Certainly the best satire—whether it is "coarsely spiced" in the manner of Bion, telling the truth with a laugh like Horace, or wounding and punishing like Juvenal—makes greatly uneasy reading. But how can it do otherwise, since its main function is to hold up to ridicule or scorn the vices and follies of the day?

Since most satirical writing is topical and often personal, the question naturally arises how a satirist can hope to produce a permanent work of art. Yet, as Professor Highet points out in his engaging and well-informed study, Pope's *Dunciad* is a perfect example of what energy and originality of style can do for dated references.

One has the utmost respect for this scholarly dissection of the body of literary satire, and complete admiration for the way it traces the three main forms—monologue, parody, and narrative—back to the Old Attic Comedy of Aristophanes. Still, it is puzzling, to say the least, to find no mention of Martial in the book. All that space devoted to such Roman satirists as Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, and not a single reference to Martial, as if he had never lived! This is all the more bewildering since in the history of the epigram Martial is indisputably the greatest name.

Indeed, it is possible to say that if we wish to gain a true picture of Rome and Roman life, about the year 90 A.D., it is to Martial, rather than to Juvenal, that we should turn. For some inexplicable reason Professor Highet chooses to couple the lampoon with the epigram, suggesting that the lampoon is "the poisoner or the gunman," while satire is "the physician or the policeman." But this still does not excuse his omission of Martial, one of the great satiric wits of Rome's Silver Age. It makes even less sense when we consider that Martial is good-tempered, while Juvenal is a soured and disappointed man.

If satire is at its lowest ebb in the U.S. today, not everybody is willing to acknowledge it. There are some, like anthologist Carlisle, who are dogged collectors of early American invective and keep telling themselves that irreverence is no longer out of fashion, that a new age of satire is just around the corner. But the evidence in Mr. Carlisle's *American Satire in Prose and Verse* points to quite the opposite. He even admits in his introduction that the nation does not lack gentle spoofers, but satirists with something like Mark Twain's fury are much harder to come by.

With the stress on old reliables instead of new "finds," the collection is guaranteed to take the reading public's mind *off* its troubles, which is unfortunately not Mr. Carlisle's intention. "I must admit to a prejudice," he says, "for the sort of American satire that means business, that says something about the kind of people we are." His disinterring c satiric writers from our more vigo ous past—John Trumbull and Benja min Franklin on higher educatio the almost unreadable Petroleum V Nasby on the Civil War, and A temus Ward with his tame brand c cracker-barrel jocularity—has a ce tain historical value, but unfortu nately nothing else.

The sad truth is that the U.S. ha had only a handful of hard-hittin satirists—Twain and Lardner, Bench ley, Thurber and Philip Wylie i "their more abrasive moments. Their presence in the book may hel the cause of entertainment, but th high excellence of their bristling wi only emphasizes how denatured ou humor has become in the last tw decades. It's too bad, in a way, tha it was technically impossible to in clude a sampling of the new schoo of stand-up satirists such as Mor Sahl and Bob Newhart. For al though it is fairly certain that neithe of these night-club monologists are aware of the Greek and Roman origins of satire, both of them use many of the same devices.

Europe, it seems, can still produce brilliant social lampoons in fictional disguise. Aubrey Menen, whose *The Prevalence of Witches* won him a devoted audience, has obviously been weaned on Voltaire. Keeping remarkable pace with the newspaper headlines, and relying on shock effects and improbable situations, Mr. Menen's serio-comic novel is presented in the guise of an impish fantasy. It's cast is not only international but celestial—the Buddha, the Archangel Michael, the Devil, the President of the United States and his bungling foreign affairs advisers, the pro-cannibalistic leader of an African state just admitted to the U.N., and the usual grim comedians representing Communist China and the Russians.

The discovery that there are two Dalai Lamas, one a frivolous young girl and the other a young man whose ambition is to be an astronaut, creates considerable disturbance both in Nirvana and on earth. However, the fact that a third world war is barely averted hardly fazes the Buddha, for it seems he has more world-shaking worries on his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ıind. He has not been able to con-
ey his secret to those busy people
n earth—which is that the whole
uman race is running itself ragged
ɔr nothing.

Erih Kos is a Yugoslavian writer
/hose acidly drawn observations of
fe in Belgrade should scarcely
ıake him popular with the Party.
Iis is a deceptively simple tale. A
/hale, which is a new sight to the
ity folk, is captured off the Adriatic
Joast and put on exhibition in Bel-
;rade, after which people can talk
ɔr think of nothing else. The nar-
ator, an insignificant civil servant,
:an't share their excitement. In fact,
ıis whole career is transformed by
he presence of the whale. He an-
agonizes his fat landlady who
loesn't look unlike a whale, loses his
nistress and creates bad feeling in
ıis office. In the end, the whale rots
ınd its stench permeates the town.
Dnly then, when the fickle public
ıas turned against the whale in its
lecomposed state, does our quixotic
ıero feel any sympathy for the
leified mammal, proving himself a
rue non-conformist to the end.

The Immigrants' Miraculous Dream

America America. By Elia Kazan. Stein and Day. $4.95.

by William James Smith

"GADG, baby, you're a nigger, too." So says James Baldwin in a jacket "puff" for Elia Kazan's scenario-novel about a turn-of-the-century Armenian immigrant boy. The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy couldn't put it down. Nobel Prize-winner John Steinbeck found it EXTREMELY interesting and Archibald MacLeish EXCITING. Several other notables, including President A. Whitney Griswold of Yale University, contribute similar words of praise. Surely men of their stature can not have been suborned. Besides, the book *is* good and the motion picture which Gadg envisions will be a splendid one indeed if ever he does direct it.

Whether the picture will ever be made is another matter. The scenario is not exactly box office material. The love story is not of a boy for a girl but of a boy for a country, one which he has never seen, at that. Stavros Topouzoglou is a twenty-year-old Armenian boy living with his family in terror of their Turkish rulers. His father has settled for bribing his way to some sort of precarious safety, but Stavros, once he has seen the futility of insurrection, dreams only of the New World and its soaring towers. He is all innocence and servility and deprecating smiles, but a core of fanatic determination burns within him. He must get to America. No labor, no compromise, no betrayal of others or of himself is too great if he can realize his goal. Murder, slavery, prostitution he is willing to use as a means to his end. Eventually he drops even his name, his very personality, and assumes that of a friend who dies to save him. "America America" his Old World friends call him and eventually he attains the magic land. It is inevitable, given Mr. Kazan's brand of bitter irony, that America the

The BIBLE Today

a periodical promoting popular appreciation of the Word of God

Editors:

Rev. Eugene Maly, Chairman
Mt. St. Mary's Seminary
Norwood, Ohio

Rev. Barnabas Ahern, C.P.
Passionist Fathers Seminary
Louisville, Kentucky

Mother Kathryn Sullivan, R.S.C.J.
Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart
Purchase, New York

THE BIBLE TODAY is designed to answer the renewed interest of Catholics in the Word of God . . . to provide a gradual and continuing education in Scriptural matters. For the literate Christian who wants to know what the Bible *really* says, what it means for him, personally, THE BIBLE TODAY presents the established conclusions of scholars in meaningful, intelligible language.

Each issue will be 64 pages, illustrated, with annotated book listings, catechetical aids for Bible teaching, Scripture through the world today, readings from the Fathers of the Church.

THE BIBLE TODAY will publish 12 issues in a two-year period. Subscription for 12 issues is $5.00. Bulk rate for 10 or more copies sent to one address is 25¢ per copy.

PUBLISHED By

THE LITURGICAL PRESS Collegeville Minnesota

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EARLY SHOPPERS
best sellers for
CHRISTMAS
GIVING

FOR THE PRIEST

Adsum
A Bishop Speaks To His Priests
by Most Rev. J. Pohlschneider
This practical book of spiritual direction for the clergy will strike a responsive chord in the minds of every apostolic priest. $3.25

FOR THE SCHOOL SISTER

The Spirituality of the Teaching Sister
by Reverend Edward F. Kenrick
Written with vigor and intelligence, Father Kenrick's work points out to every religious educator the most generous and up-to-date means of holiness. $4.50

FOR RELIGIOUS

The Principles of Monasticism
by Maurus Wolter, O.S.B.
A classic on the foundations of the monastic life, this monumental work is a source book of reflections on every aspect of religious observance. $12.00

GIFTS FOR ALL

Christian Prayer
by Rev. F. M. Moschner
How to be faithful in the practice of prayer amid the distractions of modern life, is the theme of this complete treatise on the practice of prayer. $4.95

Only Jesus
by Archbishop Luis M. Martinez
A spiritual book admirably suited to the needs of modern Christians, namely, to accept Christ in a vital way as Mediator, Exemplar, and head of the mystical body. $4.75

The Unity of Faith
by Brother Robert Wood, S.M.
Beginning with a short history of the ecumenical councils, the author discusses the bases for unification in a manner which can be appreciated and understood by the Catholic and non-Catholic alike. $2.75

At your bookstore or from:
herder of st. louis
17 South Broadway
St. Louis 2, Mo.

country proves somewhat less miraculous than Stavros' dream. Stravros himself, however—and it is the best possible tribute to Mr. Kazan's real artistry—is unaware, as he shines shoes, of his author's wry brooding. Stavros, transmogrified into Joe, grabs his tips and cries, "Next! Come on, you, let's go, you! People waiting!" And the dimes go to bring his family to America, one by one. His joy has not been diminished by the discovery that his love is not perfect.

It is strange, as S. N. Behrman says in his introduction to *America America*, that the theme of immigration has played so little a role in the fiction of the New World. Certainly future generations will look back to these vast movements of people with an awe difficult for us to comprehend—surging tides of humanity which are still washing around the shores of the world, dreaming of escape and clawing for a spot in a New Land. Much of it is grimmest necessity, then as now, and that may well be one reason for its rejection as creative material. It is something people put behind them and try to forget for a variety of reasons. It is the dark past, not the bright future, but we owe Mr. Kazan a vote of thanks for reminding us that it is there.

Tennessee Williams, with whom Mr. Kazan has been so prominently associated in a directorial capacity, is said to have approached the manuscript version of *America America* with the same sort of nervous misgivings that I believe I had, the doubts one has about a friend who has written a novel after thirty years in the garment industry. Well, not quite, but knowing that Mr. Kazan was a man of creative talent might even have made the approach more nerve-racking. A failure would be so much more distressing. Tennessee was delighted to discover then that it was GOOD. Without the emphasis, I go along with him. *America America* is not a "promising first novel." It is not a novel at all, for that matter. But it is an honest (what greater praise?) and well-turned piece of work. I hope that some day Mr. Kazan will be able to bring his other skills to bear on it and direct a film version.

A Family Exchange

Mother and Son. By Isoko and Ichir Hatano. Houghton Mifflin. $3.75.

by Jean and Kurt Holzhauer

DEAR KURT: This correspondenc between a Japanese mother and so from 1944 to 1948 has a certain his torical interest. For American read ers, it reveals the emotions of on family in a then enemy country. Bu it seems to me that its appeal i primarily a human one.

Like mothers everywhere, Mrs Hatano is concerned not only witl her son's reactions to a war whicl she no better than he is equipped t interpret, but with his total devel opment, his feelings toward his fam ily, his friends and his education.

These glimpses of Japanese domes tic life often seem as exotic as minia ture gardens, and as gently artificial The Hatanos' correspondence begar while Ichiro and his mother were living under the same roof. Thei habit of exchanging letters apparent ly came about because Isoko's sched

CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN ART CENTER
formerly Beuron Art
Distinctive Art for Church and School. Unusual Gifts. Wood Carvings. Ceramic. Enamels
1053 Lexington Ave., N.Y. 21, N.Y., BU 8-818(

Classified

● RATES: 25¢ a word, 12 words minimum
Centered lines: $1.50 a line, 2 lines minimum.
Discounts: 3 times, 5%; 7 times, 10%; 13 times, 15%. Payable with order.
Classified Display: $14 per column inch, 2¼" column. Same time discounts.

Irish Books and Gifts
● Books, Linens, Gifts, *Catalogs.*
IRISH INDUSTRIES DEPOT
831 Lexington Ave. (near 63rd), N.Y. 21, N.Y.

Chesterton and Belloc Books
● CHESTERTON'S and BELLOC'S Books. 200+ titles stocked. Free Catalogue.
Andrew Prosser, 3118 N. Keating, Chicago 41, Ill.

Mission Needs
● "MY CATHOLIC FAITH," 100 copies needed. Donations of $3 appreciated. ST. MARY'S MISSION, Above Rocks, Jamaica, W.I.

Magazine on Books
● *Introducing*
THE BOOKLOVER'S ANSWER
New bimonthly magazine features news, reviews and offerings of new books, second hand books, out of print books and rare books; plus private press reports, reviews of little magazines, bibliographia, author outlines; and more! Introductory one year subscription, $2. THE BOOKLOVER'S ANSWER, Box 284, Woodstock 11, N. Y.

The Commonweal for Christmas
1 Gift Subscription, $8; Each Additional, $6.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ile permitted few conversations with ier boy. Not only was she a teacher, vriter and lecturer, with a husband ind several young children, but her iousehold duties apparently took nany more hours than even an American wife spends in this way.

Then there is the structure of the Japanese family. You noticed, perhaps, that although Isoko is much respected by her colleagues and editors she must drive herself to accept invitations to sit on local committees and radio panels. She points out to her son that Japanese college women 20 years ago were still looked upon with distrust by their elders; her husband's family was not altogether convinced that a "blue-stocking" would make a good wife. And her own respect for Ichiro's father is unshakable, even when Ichiro suggests that his father might reasonably assume more of the wartime household duties. The father, she writes, is an intellectual. His time for thinking and lecturing must come first.

Undoubtedly this regard for the superior male has much to do with her meticulous explanations and occasional apologies to her son for what strikes us as blameless conduct. Her concern for helping Ichiro to understand everything that is happening to him, even remarks by servants and the disposition of one of his pets, is greater than one would be likely to see in a more casual American family.

This concern is very nice, and I am sure you approve it. It is certainly responsible in part for the fact that Ichiro comes through the difficult uprootings of the war, the changes of schools and companions, and the short separation from his family, as well as he does.

Dear Mother: I noticed this, too, and I thought the mother had common sense, as well as "brain." Her love for her family was very great, and that is clearly demonstrated by the sacrifices she makes for her family and the small amounts of rest and food she rewards herself with. In her letters she doesn't say much about herself, but wants to make sure Ichiro is all right.

But I thought Ichiro sounded younger than he was. Even his mother remarks that he is getting interested in building models long after his friends were building them, and that his friends want to borrow all his good books before he has got interested in reading them. I wondered if he would have grown up faster if his mother had let him figure out more things for himself. He seemed more intelligent than some of his friends, or some of us American teen-agers, in a way. For instance, he could write very well. But he didn't seem to know how to use his intelligence, until he was about eighteen.

I think the war benefited him by giving him a better grip on life. And I think the war is what made these letters interesting, since it brought out feelings and thoughts which might otherwise have been unknown.

REVIEWERS

Richard McLaughlin is a Massachusetts newspaperman.

William James Smith is a free-lance writer and critic.

Jean Holzhauer is a regular contributor. Her young son, Kurt, here makes his first appearance in The Commonweal.

The Commonweal for Christmas

Readers who received a gift subscription to The Commonweal last Christmas have been enjoying a wide variety of meaningful articles, foreign dispatches, poems, letters and editorials—plus discerning reviews of the more interesting books, plays and movies.

Week by week they have been enjoying the comment of such typical Commonweal authors as: Philip Scharper, Ronald Steel, Barbara Ward, Nat Hentoff, Martin Turnell, H. A. Reinhold, David Riesman, Gregory Baum, George H. Dunne, Horace Gregory and Thomas Merton. That is why The Commonweal makes such a welcome gift.

Special rates are available to encourage subscribers to order Christmas gift subscriptions. The first subscription costs $8, each additional one $6.50. (Foreign postage $2 extra.) Subscribers may also include their own renewals at these rates.

Order now, pay later ►

For Gift Orders

THE COMMONWEAL **11/30**
232 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N.Y.
Please send The Commonweal for one year to:

NAME .....
ADDRESS .....
CITY, ZONE, STATE .....
Send gift card to me ☐ for me ☐ Renewal ☐

NAME .....
ADDRESS .....
CITY, ZONE, STATE .....
Send gift card to me ☐ for me ☐ Renewal ☐

MY NAME .....
ADDRESS .....
CITY, ZONE, STATE .....
$.....**enclosed** ☐ **Bill me later**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shades of Graham Greene!

In the past

Greene is "open to criticism in [his] inartistic and unworthy use of religion to give a specious glamour to sin." — MARTIN TURNELL, *The Commonweal*

"... with Mr. Greene's work, the body is seen as corrupted, yet sensuality is sadly pursued." —*The Dublin Review*

"If *The Heart of the Matter* were submitted ... it would be placed nominally on the Index." —*The New World* (Chicago)

In 1962

VESSEL OF DISHONOR is "a bad novel making a specious point.... [It] will undoubtedly scandalize or mislead many who do read it....

"The cheapest sort of fiction ... does not dwell on [physical attributes] more crassly, clinically, or sensuo-sentimentally." —RT. REV. MSGR. JOHN S. KENNEDY, *Our Sunday Visitor*

"Incredibly tasteless ... a disgrace to its publishers."— D. BERNARD THEALL, O.S.B.

But, like Mr. Greene, perhaps Paul Roche is entitled to a *literary* hearing...

"There is a certain majesty peculiar to the best prose which lends it the unique ability to transcend whatever sordidness may seem to be present in its theme, to make beautiful what would seem only sensational and vulgar in a work of lesser quality ... VESSEL OF DISHONOR is invested with this uniqueness.... An important work from a talented young author."—*Pittsburgh Press*

"Things like this have happened, alas, and are, it must be admitted in honesty, fair material for the novelist's pen." — HAROLD C. GARDINER, S.J., *America*

"Will evoke, I think, as many reactions as there are readers. Here you will find verbal artistry, a taut plot, and an uncommon insight into the soul of a priest. But here also is the abandonment of a priestly vocation, freely and maturely chosen."— REV. F. X. CANFIELD, President, Catholic Library Association, *The Michigan Catholic*

"We experience with Martin the beauty of God's world and of human love, and at its end, more conscious of our own creatureliness, we seek the mercy of God along with the fallen priest." — REV. JOSEPH M. PETULLA, *Ave Maria*



Vessel of Dishonor

By PAUL ROCHE

At your bookstore • $4.95

SHEED & WARD, 64 University Place, New York 3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED